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A U T H O R

Ryan Mabry

I

graduated from the University of Kentucky
Summa Cum Laude in May of 2007. I received
a Bachelor of Science degree with honors in
mathematics, and a minor in statistics. During my
tenure at UK, I spent time working as a peer mentor
in the AMSTEMM program; as an ambassador for
the College of Arts and Sciences; as a math tutor in
coordination with the Appalachian Math Science Partnership; and as the
baseball beat reporter for the student-run Kentucky Kernel. I am a National
Merit Scholar, have appeared on the Dean’s List seven times, and last year
received the Carolyn S. Bunyan Scholarship for outstanding mathematics
undergraduates.
Upon graduation, I plan to attend law school, where I will continue
to pursue my dream of working in the front office of a major league
baseball team. I am currently employed for the third consecutive season
by the Lexington Legends, where I perform game-day duties in the press
box. Everyday, I see the results of baseball’s antitrust exemption played
out before me.
I would like to thank Professors Joanna M. Badagliacco, Robert S.
Tannenbaum, and Harold R. Weinberg for their help in getting this project
off the ground. Without the careful guidance they each provided, this
project likely would have never even taken place. All of them have proven
critical to the success of this task.

Mentor:
Harold R. Weinberg
Wyatt Tarrant & Combs Professor of Law;
Associate Dean for Administration
Mr. Mabry’s paper is significant because it views the structure and
operation of minor league baseball though the lens of antitrust law and
economics. This approach yields practical insight into how the sport
operates, including information obtained directly from the top executive
officer of a minor league baseball team. The paper provides critical insight
into the sport as it is under the current “antitrust-free” legal regime and
as it might become if subjected to antitrust scrutiny.
Mr. Mabry’s paper is of superior quality. It demonstrates a solid
mastery of the relevant fundamental antitrust principles and provides
considerable legal and factual background concerning the antitrust
exemption and related matters. Mr. Mabry synthesizes all this into a paper
that is substantive, thoughtful, transparent, and very interesting.
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Antitrust Law and
the Minor League
Reserve System

Abstract
Minor League Baseball is a half-billion dollar a year
industry in the United States. It has grown to its
current state under an umbrella of protection from
U.S. antitrust statutes. Beginning with the Federal
Baseball decision in 1922, the Supreme Court has
consistently ruled that professional baseball is
exempt from both the Sherman and Clayton Acts—
the seminal federal government statutes regarding
antitrust. This status is unique; no other professional
sport enjoys such immunity. If the exemption were
lost, the effects on this staple of American culture
would likely be extremely disruptive. Throughout
this project, I analyzed the effects that a change in
the application of federal antitrust law would have on
two aspects of the game: 1) the player development
agreements between the major league franchises
and their minor league affiliates, and 2) the standard
player contracts signed by every minor league player,
which bind them to the team that drafted them until
well after they make it to the major leagues. After
finding that a change in the way the courts interpret
past decisions would prevent both of these aspects
from operating the way they have in the past due
to concerns over their anticompetitive effects, I
consider the likelihood that these changes would
actually be made. The court system’s reluctance
to violate precedent; the effect of the antitrust
“rule of reason,” which allows for some anticompetitive activity provided that the actions yield
even greater “pro-competitive benefits;” and the
antitrust exemptions provided specifically for labor
agreements arranged through collective bargaining
are all considered during the process of finding that
Minor League Baseball is most likely secure in its
desire to remain unimpacted by federal antitrust law.
While previous discussions have focused solely on
the major leagues, this study builds on their work
to look at the effects the antitrust laws have on the
minor league game.
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Introduction
Antitrust law and baseball are intertwined in such a way
that they may never be completely separated. Ever since
the Federal Baseball decision in 1922, baseball has been
exempt from the governance of federal antitrust law.
Although its effect on the player-owner relationship in
the major leagues is barely felt today, the exemption’s
power still holds strong in the minor leagues, where
players work at their craft under an antiquated reserve
system that stifles their ability to earn what they are
truly worth. Ironically, it is that very reserve system that
allows the minor leagues to exist. This discussion will
cover several relevant points of interest to this topic,
including the genesis of the antitrust laws; the creation
of baseball’s exemption to those laws; the players’
struggle to skirt that exemption; and, finally, the piece
will settle on a discussion of what this situation means
to the minor league franchises and cities that thrive on
baseball’s lower ranks.

Antitrust Law and Sports
The legislators of the late nineteenth century were
concerned with business concentration; the acquisition
of monopoly power by American companies; subsequent
wealth transfers from consumers to monopolists; and
the ever-present links between economic and political
power. In an effort to respond to these populist concerns,
encouraging competition and lowering prices for
consumers in the process, Congress passed the Sherman
Antitrust Act in 1890 (Sullivan and Harrison, 2003, p.
3). Section One of the Act states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every
person who shall make any contract or engage
in any combination or conspiracy hereby
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of
a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if
a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000,
or by imprisonment not exceeding three years,
or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the court. (15 U.S.C. §1)
Section Two of the Act similarly provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
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not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation,
or, if any other person, $350,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court. (15 U.S.C. §2)
These two sections make up the primary provisions
of the Sherman Act, which spans seven sections. Sections
One and Two create a sort of dichotomy, whereby
defendants are usually only reasonably eligible to be
prosecuted under one rule or the other, although it is
quite common for a plaintiff to allege violations of both
sections as a legal strategy. This application of the law
rises from the idea that it would be impossible for a firm
to “combine” with itself and thus violate Section One.
Therefore, although it is possible for a single entity to
violate the Sherman Act’s first section by restraining
trade through a monopoly, single entities are normally
liable under the first section only if there is a strong case
against the firm in question under Section Two, which
forbids monopolization of an industry. Similarly, it would
be difficult to prosecute multiple firms under Section
Two, because a monopoly, by definition, involves only
one firm providing a product or service. Of course, there
are exceptions to this rule as well, as “shared monopoly”
theories exist. However, in general, plaintiffs alleging
actions by two or more firms conspiring in restraint
of trade would be advised to bring complaints under
Section One.
Sports leagues are typically prosecuted under
Section One, and so a league will commonly claim to be
a single entity in defense of its actions. Prosecution of a
league under Section Two, while possible, is difficult. It
must not only be shown that the league has monopoly
power, but that it also has undergone efforts other than
market competition to achieve or maintain this power.
(Sullivan and Harrison, 2003, p. 299)
Assuming that a league is not a single entity, there
is still another hurdle for potential plaintiffs to scale.
Antitrust court decisions fall into one of two categories:
“per se” violations are actions that violate the antitrust
laws so directly that it is very unlikely that any legal
justification can be given; “rule of reason” violations, on
the other hand, must be shown to have anti-competitive
effects that are so great that they outweigh any procompetitive benefits the agreement in question provides.
Since the Supreme Court decision in National Collegiate
Athletic Association v. Board of Regents (1984), in which
the NCAA (the National Collegiate Athletic Association)
was sued by The Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia
for its restrictive football television contracts, sports
leagues have been evaluated under the “rule of reason”
doctrine. This decision has automatically added an extra
layer to any antitrust proceeding involving a sports
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league. The Court explained its decision to move to a “rule of reason”
approach by acknowledging that some restraints on competition are
necessary for sports leagues to exist (468 U.S. 85 at 103).
Another prominent antitrust statute that has importance to the operation
of sports leagues is the Clayton Antitrust Act. It was passed in 1914, and
was meant to close perceived gaps in the Sherman Act. Additionally, the
legislature was not pleased with the construction of the “rule of reason,”
which was crafted in the court system. Many parts of the Act, which spans
sixteen sections, have few applications to sports, and are rarely if ever seen
in sports antitrust trials. However, Section Six of the Act has produced an
important consideration for negotiations with a union:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural,
or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual
help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to
forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such
organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the
antitrust laws. (15 U.S.C. §17)
This section was crafted in response to some court decisions in
which labor unions were found to be in violation of the Sherman Act.
(Kaiser, 2004, p. 239) The language here essentially allows labor unions
to exist, exempting them from antitrust legislation. This is known as the
“statutory” labor exemption. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has adopted
a “nonstatutory” exemption for labor regarding the results of the process
of collective bargaining. Out of deference to the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), courts have held that terms agreed upon during collective
bargaining are exempt from antitrust law, no matter how uncompetitive
the terms are. (Kaiser, 2004, p. 240)
The antitrust laws described to this point have caused sports leagues in
the United States some problems in the past. As was mentioned above, a pair
of universities successfully sued the NCAA under federal antitrust law for
forcing its member institutions to enter into television contracts that limited
their potential exposure and revenue in order to give other institutions an
equal amount of attention. In the professional arena, the NFL (the National
Football League) was forced to allow the Oakland Raiders to move to Los
Angeles in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football
League (1984). Many other antitrust actions have been taken with varying
results. However, professional baseball is exempt from nearly all antitrust
suits. This exemption stems from a decision that was handed down by
the Supreme Court in 1922: Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National
League (1922).

Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption
In the Federal Baseball case, a team from Baltimore that was a member of
the Federal League sued the major leagues. The Federal League was the
last legitimate rival to the National and American Leagues at that time. The
Baltimore Terrapins claimed that the major leagues had conspired to prevent
Baltimore from becoming a viable franchise by denying them access to major
league players with the reserve system, which bound players indefinitely to
the franchises that had signed them originally.
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Initially, the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia ruled in favor of the plaintiff for damages
of $80,000, which were trebled under Section Four of
the Clayton Act. (15 U.S.C. §15) However, the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia reversed the decision
on the major leagues’ appeal, and the U.S. Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed the reversal. Associate
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote the opinion
for the Court and memorably proclaimed:
The business is giving exhibitions of base
ball, which are purely state affairs. It is true
that, in order to attain for these exhibitions
the great popularity that they have achieved,
competitions must be arranged between clubs
from different cities and States. But the fact
that in order to give the exhibitions the Leagues
must induce free persons to cross state lines
and must arrange and pay for their doing so
is not enough to change the character of the
business. (259 U.S. 200 at 208)
Justice Holmes was addressing one of the primary
requirements for a federal antitrust violation, that is,
the defendant must have been involved in interstate
commerce for prosecution under federal law. Having
found that baseball did not involve interstate commerce,
Holmes rationalized that Baltimore’s antitrust claim
could go no further. This decision, however, did not
simply prevent the Baltimore club from receiving
damages. It effectively exempted professional baseball
from federal antitrust statutes altogether.
Thirty-one years later, George Toolson tested
baseball’s exemption in Toolson v. New York Yankees
(1953). Toolson was a player in the Yankees’ farm
system. When the Yankees attempted to demote him
from his position with Newark of the International
League to a team in Binghamton of the Eastern League,
he refused to report. The Yankees “blacklisted” him,
effectively ending his baseball career, and Toolson
brought action against the team in protest of the reserve
system.
In a one paragraph opinion, the Court reaffirmed by
a 7-2 margin the existence of baseball’s exemption, and
explained that Congress had done nothing to attempt to
alter the decision in Federal Baseball; baseball had been
permitted to develop since the Federal Baseball decision
with the understanding that it was exempt from federal
antitrust law; and legislation should be the means by
which this exemption is overturned in order to follow the
doctrine of stare decisis, under which it is necessary for
a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same
points arise again in litigation (346 U.S. 356 at 357).
In 1972, the Supreme Court heard an argument
against the reserve system and the antitrust exemption
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for the final time in Flood v. Kuhn (1972). Curt Flood
was a center fielder for the St. Louis Cardinals. In
1969, he was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies, a
move which he opposed. He petitioned Bowie Kuhn,
baseball’s commissioner at the time, for free agency,
but was rejected. In response, he brought suit against
the commissioner.
This scenario was similar to the one presented in
Toolson in many ways, and predictably, a verdict similar
to the one given in Toolson was delivered. Associate
Justice Harry Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court,
which decided by a 5-3 margin. In his opinion, Justice
Blackmun acknowledged that baseball’s exemption was
unique, but refused to overturn Federal Baseball for the
same reasons mentioned in Toolson. He repeated the
Toolson Court’s demand that Congress make any changes
in the application of this precedent.
Considering the weight of precedent in the court
system’s decision-making process, baseball’s exemption
seemed almost impenetrable. The reserve system looked
like an immovable establishment. However, by 1968, the
seeds had already been planted for the end of baseball’s
reserve system in the major leagues.

The End of the Major League
Reserve System
The Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA)
had been the players’ formal bargaining representative
since 1954, but the players had not taken the initiative
of negotiating a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
under the National Labor Relations Act until 1968. The
first CBA was simple, and essentially maintained the
status quo, but it was important because it established a
dialogue between the MLBPA and baseball’s owners.
In 1970, the players and owners established an
arbitration panel with a mutually selected chairman.
The panel would resolve disputes between the two
sides involving any subject besides “the integrity of
baseball,” which remained under the commissioner’s
discretion. Three years later, at the expiration of the 1970
agreement, the players asked the owners for free agency.
After a bargaining session, the owners agreed to allow
players with two full seasons of major league experience
to have their salaries determined by an arbitrator. The
agreement also contained language that gave players
who had played in the league for at least ten years, the
last five of which having been with the same team, the
right to veto any trade involving himself (Major League
Rule 9(e)). If this agreement had been made four years
earlier, Curt Flood would have had the right to choose
to stay with the Cardinals.
Finally, at the conclusion of the 1975 season, the
MLBPA was able to end the reserve system in the major
leagues just three years after the Flood decision. Two
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players, Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally, refused
to sign their standard contracts. They took their cases
to arbitrator Peter Seitz, whose role had been written
into the previous CBA. Seitz determined that the reserve
clause did not constitute an indefinite right of renewal,
but rather entailed a one-year team option — in other
words, the clause only gave the team the ability to
renew the player’s contract for one year after the first
contract was signed. Essentially, the players had been
granted free agency.
The owners attempted a lockout in response, but
Commissioner Kuhn ordered the spring training camps to
open to begin the 1976 season. A new CBA was reached
during the summer, and free agency was officially
written into the agreement. The players accepted a
few owner-proposed restrictions that delayed true freeagency for several years after a player’s big-league career
had begun, but the major league reserve system was
weakened beyond the point of recognition.
Additionally, in 1998 Congress passed the Curt Flood
Act. The Act proclaimed that baseball’s exemption from
antitrust law as it concerned the relationship between
players and management had been repealed (15 U.S.C.
§26b). Occurring forty-five years after the Toolson Court
had made its initial plea for a Congressional ruling, the
Act amounted to little more than political posturing.
It came in the wake of the struggle that characterized
the relationship between the players and the owners
in the 1990s, which saw a player strike that resulted
in the cancellation of a World Series. Now that the
players and owners negotiate by means of CBAs, federal
antitrust law has little, if any, effect on the discussion.
The nonstatutory labor exemption exempts the owners
from prosecution for any anticompetitive measures they
might choose to take, and the players have no need to
use antitrust to get their way; the NLRA allows them
all the bargaining weapons they require (Kaiser, 2004,
p. 230).
It may have taken a century of work and negotiation,
but the reserve system has been put to rest in the
major leagues. However, its legacy lives on in another
form: Minor League Baseball, without the benefit of a
players’ union, has maintained a reserve system since
its establishment.

The Minor Leagues
Minor League Baseball (MiLB) is a collection of twenty
professional baseball leagues comprised of the affiliates
of Major League Baseball (MLB) teams. These teams and
leagues are independently owned, but operate in concert
with MLB; this is most prominently demonstrated by the
fact that the contracts of the players on each team are
owned by the major league team with which the minor
league franchise is affiliated. The minor leagues consist
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of several distinct levels, namely Class AAA, Class AA, Class A, ShortSeason A, and Rookie. Class A is further subdivided into Short Season
Class A, Full Season Class A, and Class A-Advanced; Rookie leagues are
also sub-classified as Rookie or Rookie-Advanced (National Association
Agreement, Section 10.02(d)). Players are drafted and/or signed out of
high school, college, or foreign countries by a major league team and
assigned to a low-level minor league team. As their skills improve and
they gain more experience, they are transferred to a team on a higher
level, with the eventual goal of getting to AAA, and then to the major
leagues.
The relationship between MLB and MiLB is governed by an
umbrella contract called the Professional Baseball Agreement (PBA).
It is re-negotiated every seven to ten years (the current PBA was made
effective on October 1, 2004, and runs through September 30, 2014),
and includes a provision allowing the agreement to be terminated in
the event of a work stoppage or a change in the application of antitrust
law to professional baseball (Professional Baseball Agreement, Article
III (A) (1-4)). MLB and MiLB have negotiated PBAs since 1992. The
PBA provides stability to the minor leagues, because the relationship
between MLB and MiLB was only loosely organized before 1992 (Stein
Interview). Among the issues governed by the agreement are: a provision
for a percentage of MiLB’s ticket revenue to be paid to MLB (5.5%
in 2007, set to escalate to 7.0% by 2011); a requirement that a minor
league team should vacate a territory in return for fair compensation if a
major league team should move into said territory; allowances for MLB
to conduct marketing campaigns in minor league stadiums and have
access to all telecast feeds of minor league games; and, most pertinent
to this discussion, the assurance that the MLB teams will maintain a
Player Development Contract (PDC) with each of at least 160 minor
league teams each season.
The standard PDC is contained in Rule 56 of the Major League
Rules, which are negotiated between MLB, MiLB, and the MLBPA. The
PDC is not permitted to be changed, and a maximum $500,000 fine is
written into the agreement as a deterrent to any team attempting to
modify or add to the PDC (Major League Rule 56(a)). PDC agreements
are made between a minor league and a major league club, are only
permitted to be made for either two or four year periods, and terminate
automatically if a new PBA is negotiated (Major League Rule 56(c)). The
PDC divides all the expenses associated with the operation of a minor
league franchise between the major league and minor league clubs, from
travel expenses all the way down to the bats and balls used on the field,
and even includes provisions for items such as telephone service to the
field manager’s office in each clubhouse. While salaries for players,
coaches, and trainers; some equipment expenses; and hotel rooms are
paid for by the big league club, the minor league team is responsible
for most of the day-to-day expenses associated with the operation of
the team. In addition, Major League Rule 58 establishes minimum
facility standards for minor league venues. This rule governs everything
contained in a stadium, from the number of seats for spectators down
to the brightness of the lights shining on the field (Major League Rule
Attachment 58).
The minor league franchise has no control over what players,
coaches, and trainers are assigned to it by the major league team with
which it is associated. Players are commonly promoted or demoted
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one or more levels by the major league management.
Often, a change in affiliation at the expiration of a PDC
is not initiated by the major league club, but instead
by a minor league club whose ownership feels it is
not being provided enough talented players by the
major league club to be a successful attendance draw
(Stein Interview).
The minor leagues are a great asset to Major
League Baseball. They are not only a place where
many major league stars are developed, but also
generate fan interest; supply a pool of readily available
players when current major leaguers become injured
or lose effectiveness; provide a place for major
league players to rehabilitate from injury; and corner
the market on nearly all available talent, making it
essentially impossible for a rival league to form. Of
course, there are other well-established barriers to
entry for a potential rival league, including a lack of
available baseball markets and the inability to attract
media coverage.
A major league franchise will commonly have six
or more minor league affiliates, four of which (Full
Season Class A and above) play 140-game seasons
beginning in April and ending in September. These
minor leagues resemble the operation of the major
leagues in many ways, with teams traveling from
one member town to another to play three-to-four
game series before moving on to another town or
returning home to host a series. The leagues come
complete with an all-star showcase at the season’s
midway point, and hold playoffs in September, when
the major leagues are conducting the final month of
their season (Major League Rule 32(b)).
The teams that do not play full seasons begin play in
late June, after the annual First-Year Player Draft. These
leagues represent the lower levels of the minor leagues,
and are typically stocked with players who have been
acquired recently by the major league franchises out of
high school or college.
Every player who is drafted must sign a Minor
League Uniform Player Contract (MLUPC) in order to
play in the minor leagues. The body of this contract
is written in “eight point fine print and is divided into
twenty-seven paragraphs covering subjects such as
parties to the contract, schedule of payments, loyalty,
dispute resolution, termination, governing state law,
and pictures of players.” (Crownover, 1995, p. 228) This
portion of the contract is not permitted to be changed.
Another part of the contract allows for a signing bonus
and other considerations. The minimum monthly pay
schedule is strict and amounts to barely more than
minimum wage for the players at the lowest levels.
While baseball claims that player salaries are “open to
negotiation,” a player has no leverage with which to
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negotiate. His choices are limited to taking the salary
offered by his team, or leaving baseball. As a player
progresses through the minors, minimum monthly pay
increases, but it never approaches the major league
minimum salaries that have been collectively bargained
through the MLBPA. The minimum for a player in
Class AAA is $2,150 per month, which amounts to
less than $10,000 per year in what is essentially a four
and one-half month season (“General Minor League
Information”). In contrast, the current major league
minimum salary is $380,000 per year (2007-2011 Basic
Agreement, Article VI.(B)).
The same reserve system that the major league
players worked so hard to abolish is still at work in the
minor leagues. Included in the MLUPC is a provision
that allows the major league franchise to renew the
contract with the player under the same terms for seven
separate seasons including the one during which the
contract was signed (Major League Rule Attachment
3 (VI.) (A.)).
If a player reaches the major leagues, the MLUPC
is replaced with a major league contract, but the player
can still be sent back to the minor leagues during a
maximum of three separate seasons without the team
having to fear the player’s acquisition by another team.
Once a player has accumulated three professional
seasons, the player must pass through a waiver process
in order to move between the major and minor leagues,
giving other major league teams the opportunity to claim
his rights (Major League Rule 10(e)). Furthermore, the
Rule 5 Draft (Major League Rule 5) permits major league
teams the ability to select any player not retained on
another major league team’s forty-man roster, provided
the selecting team keeps the player on its major league
roster for the entire season.
These allowances provide little mobility to the
minor league player. If they give assurance that the
player’s service to a particular major league franchise
will not continue indefinitely in the minor leagues, they
barely meet this standard. By the time a player is free
from the restrictions of the reserve system, much of his
career has already passed. A player who has languished
in the minor leagues for this length of time is very likely
to become nothing more than a journeyman or a career
minor leaguer. This is because most baseball executives
stop considering a player a “prospect” around the age
of 24, and studies have shown that the average player
typically reaches his peak production at the age of 26
or 27. Many players enter the minor leagues at the age
of 18, but an approximately equal number of players
are drafted at the ages of 20, 21, or 22. Indeed, a player
who has stayed in the minor leagues long enough to be
free from the reserve system will almost certainly never
become an established major leaguer.
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The Minor Leagues without
an Antitrust Exemption
No attempt has ever been made to challenge the minor
league reserve system, but it is widely believed that the
courts would follow the same logic that led them to
reject players’ pleas in Toolson and Flood (Szuchman,
1996, p. 279). However, imagining for a moment that
the exemption were overturned and baseball’s reserve
system were found to be in violation of federal antitrust
law, one can examine the effect that such an action might
have on Minor League Baseball, which has always been
the most persistent lobby against any legislative attempts
to remove baseball’s antitrust exemption (Roberts, 1999,
p. 413).
It is no secret that minor league player salaries are
artificially depressed by baseball’s rigid salary structure.
The salaries are set by Major League Baseball, with no
input from the players or their agents. Logically, MLB
would not create a salary structure that would award
players more than their worth. Therefore, the only
conceivable possibilities are that salaries are appropriate,
or that they are depressed. However, with no reason
given for the current salary schedule other than the
general economic welfare of MLB, the idea that these
figures are suitable is farfetched. Soon after the major
league reserve system was abolished, salaries ballooned.
There is no reason to expect any other potential result
in the minor leagues. In fact, market forces imply that
increases in compensation would be inevitable in a
system of minor league free agency.
Baseball executives generally admit that minor
league baseball players are underpaid. However, they
argue, the players are working for the potential reward of
one day earning a major league salary (Stein Interview).
As such, their jobs are highly desirable. Furthermore,
almost every player receives a bonus the first time he
signs his contract. Most of these bonuses are relatively
small ($25,000-50,000), but a few of them are valued in
the millions. The first pick of the 2006 First-Year Player
Draft received a $3.5 million bonus (“K.C.”). Still, the
fact remains that the vast majority of minor leaguers
never make it to the major leagues, and are left with next
to nothing in return for their time and effort.
If salaries are artificially low, baseball claims, it
is because they have to be in order for the teams to
employ such a large volume of players. It is difficult to
determine the exact number of players used by Minor
League Baseball, because the number always fluctuates
greatly during the season due to the First-Year Player
Draft in June. However, a reasonable estimate puts the
number in the thousands. While the actual number
of players might be relatively unknown, it is easy to
understand the ramifications if the reserve clause were
lifted. Baseball already evaluates its expenditures on
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the minor leagues to be in the hundreds of millions of
dollars (Szuchman, 1996, p. 286). Allowing salaries to
increase exponentially, the bill would quickly become
too expensive to justify payment. It is no coincidence
that none of the other major sports leagues in the
United States have minor leagues that come close to
rivaling baseball’s level of depth. The National Hockey
League has two minor leagues (the American Hockey
League and the East Coast Hockey League), while the
National Basketball Association has a sole minor league,
the National Basketball Developmental League. The
National Football League does not have a minor league
in the United States.
It is nearly certain that if the antitrust exemption
were to be revoked, fewer players would be employed
by Minor League Baseball. Without the ability to pay
the players, the major league franchises would end
their player development contracts with many of the
minor league teams. Running on meager budgets, the
newly abandoned minor league teams would not have
the ability to pay player salaries, either. The degree of
reduction in the number of affiliated players and teams
would depend on what the major league franchises
could afford, which would in turn depend on the extent
to which salaries in the minor leagues increased. Minor
League Baseball as we know it would be changed
forever, and potentially eliminated.
Assuming a small increase in player salaries that
could be managed by the major league clubs, free
agency in the minor leagues would present still another
problem. Obviously, along with free agency would come
the ability for minor league players to change teams.
As mentioned above, the major league clubs already
invest a large amount of money in player development.
Introducing the potential for players to “jump ship”
after spending years in one club’s system would
further discourage franchises from making such a large
investment in player development (Stein Interview).
Some teams might revert to the independent minor
league system that existed before Branch Rickey created
the modern “farm system” in the 1930s. The independent
leagues still exist today, on a much smaller scale. Major
League Baseball would probably attempt to retain a
small portion of the current minor league system by
purchasing franchises in order to internalize the minor
leagues and give them the protections associated with
the labor exemption, but with the increased salaries,
maintaining more than one team might not be possible.
All MLB teams currently carry a 40-man roster, but
only 25 players can be active major league players at
one time. The remaining 15 players are held on minor
league franchises, and the clubs could probably find the
funds to pay these players, even in an inflated salary
environment. In a predominately independent minor
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league system, players would play on low-budget teams
for salaries at rates of pay likely commensurate with
what they are paid in the minor leagues today, hoping
to be noticed by a big league team. Top performers in
the independent leagues would be signed by the major
leagues and put directly onto team rosters. Most high
school players would probably opt for college instead of
the independent leagues, with few having the ability to
leap straight to the major leagues. With Major League
Baseball searching for methods to develop players, not
only would the college ranks become a chief breeding
ground for major league talent, but the international
leagues would also play an increased role (Brand and
Giorgione, 2003, p. 59).

Will Minor League Baseball Lose its
Exemption?
Luckily for Minor League Baseball, there is little chance
of a court ever ending its reserve system. Unwilling to
overturn past precedent, the Supreme Court went so
far in Toolson and Flood as to ask Congress for help in
correcting the exemption. However, the Flood decision
narrowly fell in management’s favor. If one Justice who
had joined in the majority opinion had switched to the
opposite side, the Flood Court would have reached a 4-4
split. With such a tenuous grasp of the majority, it makes
sense to think about the ramifications if the minor league
system were evaluated under the rule of reason.
Minor League Baseball is a half-billion dollar a
year industry. Nearly forty million people attend games
annually (“History”). It is safe to say that the minor
leagues are a staple of American culture. As such, it is
clear that the minor leagues have merit as an institution
and, hence, should be evaluated with care. The minor
leagues would argue that the pro-competitive benefits of
the reserve system outweigh any anti-competitive effects.
In fact, the idea that the minor leagues could not exist as
they currently do without the reserve system would be
one of the league’s strongest arguments. However, if the
minor leagues were to adopt this argument, they would
still be required to adopt the least restrictive means of
maintaining the aforementioned pro-competitive benefits
(Spander, 1995, p. 113).
Another potential argument would be that the
minor leagues operate as a single entity, with the goal
of producing major league players. Unlike the major
leagues, winning a championship is often a secondary
goal for minor league franchises. Indeed, the games
often take on a side-show quality at the lower levels.
Allowing the single-entity defense would remove the
minor leagues from consideration under Section One of
the Sherman Act, because a single firm cannot commit
an antitrust violation against itself. This defense has not
always worked well for other sports leagues (726 F.2d
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1381), but the Supreme Court has never ruled definitively
on whether sports leagues should be treated as single
entities. Also, MiLB is different from other leagues that
have attempted the single-entity defense because of its
role in the larger industry of professional baseball.
Additionally, the minor leagues might argue that
the graduated pay scale negotiated into the MLUPC
provides rewards for increased performance and
simulates market conditions. Also, variations in signing
bonuses offered to players creates salary dispersion,
indicating competition. However, the Major League
Rules specifically forbid monetary bonuses associated
with improved performance (Major League Rule 3(b)
(5)), so it would appear that if baseball is attempting
to simulate a market, it does not wish to do so very
accurately. The signing bonuses certainly provide some
dispersion of minor league compensation, but a player
loses all of his power of negotiation the moment he
signs a MLUPC. If a player finds that his ability has
improved after signing a contract, his only recourse is
to hope to make the major leagues in order to receive
commensurate pay. Again, there are certainly less
restrictive options available.
Finally, there is potential for a convincing argument
in the arena of consumer welfare. MiLB might argue that
restraints on player salaries keep ticket prices down,
therefore benefiting consumers, one of the main groups
that the antitrust laws are designed to protect. The minor
leagues are making money right now, but in order to
maintain profitability in an era of minor league free
agency, one of the first approaches most teams would
be forced to attempt would be a ticket price hike. The
Supreme Court has not yet heard this argument, either,
so it has interesting potential as a defense.
Of course, allowing these arguments to be heard
before the court does not indicate that they will succeed.
The players would need only to continue the discussion
that Curt Flood started in order to make a reasonable
beginning to a case for the reserve system’s abolition. No
precedent exists to confirm or deny that a player would
succeed in bringing suit against baseball. This situation
is unique in that the player would not belong to a union;
hence, the statutory and nonstatutory labor exemptions
would not come into play as they have in other cases. For
example, in Brown v. Pro Football (1996), the Supreme
Court ruled that because practice squad salaries had been
collectively bargained, they were exempt from antitrust
law. This is a typical decision in the realm of player
challenges to management implemented conditions. At
least one legal scholar has already made an argument
that restraints in the minor leagues violate Section One
of the Sherman Act (Spander, 1995, p. 129).
If MiLB were to lose its exemption, and the courts
subsequently deemed the minor leagues to be in violation
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of the laws to which it had been newly subjected, where
then would MiLB turn? To the people who make the
laws, of course. With franchises in about 40 percent of
Congressional districts, Minor League Baseball has an
exceptionally well-oiled lobby. In 1998, MiLB successfully
lobbied to change the Curt Flood Act to explicitly state
that it would have no effect on the antitrust laws’ effect
on the minor leagues. The Curt Flood Act was mostly
a political move made in the wake of the 1994 baseball
strike to help foster a better relationship between MLB
and the MLBPA. Written into the CBA that was ratified
in December, 1996, was Article 28, a single paragraph
that stated that MLB and the MLBPA would work
together to make major league labor negotiations subject
to federal antitrust law (2007-2011 Basic Agreement,
Article XXVIII). When legislators eagerly adopted this
opportunity for political point-scoring, they were met
with fierce opposition from MiLB, which had a laundry
list of concerns with the bill. In the end, MiLB was able to
have all of its concerns addressed (Roberts, 1999, p. 437).
This success indicates that legislators consider the minor
league lobby to be an important one, and signifies that
future successes might be obtained. The sheer number
of fans who would be unhappily disenfranchised in the
event of a minor league collapse under the weight of
federal antitrust law would be reason enough for federal
legislators to become involved.
Lastly, one quite obvious possibility has been
overlooked during almost this entire discussion. What if
the minor league players were to unionize? It worked for
the major leaguers, as the MLBPA has expanded rights,
freedoms, and salaries for MLB players since it began
to flex its muscle in the 1970s. There is no question of
the minor league players’ legal ability to create a union
(Szuchman, 1996, p. 297). Of course, the union would
begin slowly, seeking few concessions in the beginning.
Eventually, however, players would request salary hikes.
A minor league union would not have the leverage that
the MLBPA possesses — players in the minor leagues
make less money; are more easily replaceable; and are
more desperate to work, because good performance in
the minors is a minor league player’s only viable route to
the major leagues. Still, MLB would be forced to bargain
with the players under the NLRA. While the players
might not gain free agency, salaries would eventually
rise. Many of the same outcomes discussed above would
likely occur as a result of the increased costs. With major
league teams already eating into some of the profits
of their minor league clubs by asking for a larger and
larger percentage of ticket revenue, increased salaries
for players would put an even tighter squeeze on minor
league ownership (Stein Interview). While the presence
of a union might not have the drastic effects on MiLB that
a change in federal antitrust law would, the unionization
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of minor league players would undoubtedly have visible
effects on the game.

Crownover, Derek C. (1995). “Minor League Rights of
Publicity Are Major League.” 2 Sports Law. J. 227.

Conclusion

Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League
of Professional Baseball Clubs, et al., 259 U.S. 200; 42
S. Ct. 465; 66 L. Ed. 898 (1922).

Minor League Baseball relies heavily on the antitrust
protection it has enjoyed since the dawn of its existence.
It has developed with an understanding that the rules
do not apply to it in the same way that they do to
other leagues and businesses. While not necessarily
devastating, destroying one of the cornerstones of this
industry’s foundation would create a tremor that would
be felt by citizens in every corner of the United States.
Our system of laws and lawmaking makes the possibility
of such an event somewhat remote, but as long as there
are people behind these laws and their interpretation,
anything is possible. There is no doubt that Minor
League Baseball will maintain a vigilant eye with the
goal of protecting its share of our national pastime.
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